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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of th.e 
STATE OF UTAH 
FLINCO, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
Case No. 10321 
THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER 
COMP ANY, a Foreign Corporation, 
Defendant - Respondent 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed an action against defendant claiming 
a breach of a franchise agreement by wrongful termina-
tion thereof and the violation of the Anti-Monopoly 
Statute of the State of Utah. The plaintiff is seeking 
damage for violation of its rights as a result of said two 
hasic kinds of conduct. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judge Ray Van Cott, Jr. granted the defendant's 
.Motion for Dismissal of plaintiff's action at the close of 
plaintiff's case in chief on the grounds that plaintiff had 
shown no right to relief and refused to submit plaintiff's 
case to the jury for its consideration. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order reversing the trial court 
and requiring submission of its case to the jury for 
determination. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On June 21, 1962, plaintiff accepted a "Goodyear 
Franchise Agreement" which is set up on a Goodyear 
Tire Company printed form, a copy of said agreement 
is attached to plaintiff's Complaint and is Exhibit No.1. 
Under the "Goodyear Franchise Agreement", plain-
tiff was designated as a dealer in tires, batteries, and 
accessories for the Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company. 
Plaintiff terminated a line of tires that it was hand-
ling, the Hood brand, and expended considerable amounts 
of its money to set up as a Goodyear Tire dealer. It 
operated under such franchise agreement until the sum-
mer of 1963, at which time defendant began to circulat2 
rumors in the Salt Lake and Ogden territories that plain-
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tiff had been cancelled as a Goodyear Tire dealer. On 
~eptember 16, 1963, d2f endant notified plaintiff in writ-
ing that under the terms of the Goodyear contract, plain-
tiff was terminated as a dealer. 
Plaintiff claims that the termination by the defend-
ant, in addition to being wrongful in the sense that th2 
terminaton occurred without notice and prior to the 
notice of said September 16, 1963, was without cause. 
Plaintiff claims that the termination was a part of an 
overall plan and design by Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Company to restrict comp2tition in rubber products, 
batteries, and accessories in the State of Utah and parti-
cularly in the area in which Flinco, Inc. operated. The 
termination is in violation of Title 50, Sec. 1, etc. U.C.A., 
1953. Plaintiff claims the termination was because it 
had taken on an additional brand of tires for distribution 
through its area, namely the Miller line. 
Plaintiff's evidence shows that the Goodyear Fran-
chise Agreement contains several contradictory and in-
consistent provisions; first, paragraph 6 provides that 
the Goodyear Tire Company may cancel the agreement 
for failure on the part of the dealer to make payments 
when due Goodyear. In paragraph 13 of the agreement, it 
provides that the agreement shall expire in five years 
from the date of execution and paragraph 14 provides 
that the agreement may be cancelled upon thirty days 
written notice by dealer to Goodyear or by Goodyear, 
through its local management, to dealer. 
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These provisions, the plaintiff claims are inconsis-
tent one with another unless the thirty day cancellation 
clause is interpreted to be for cause either set forth in 
paragraph 6 or other good and sufficient cause. No part 
of the franchise agreement contains any statement or 
agreement that the agreement could be cancelled without 
cause. The contract is not exclusive and Goodyear specifi-
cally reserved the right to sell in plaintiff's territory 
through other dealers. 
Plaintiff offered testimony concerning negotiations 
and preliminary discussions prior to the execution of the 
franchise agreement and the trial court refused to permit 
any testimony relating to said subject (R. 67-68). 
During the period prior to September 16, 1963, the 
date of cancellation, plaintiff's evidence indicated that lo-
cal representatives of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company 
were stating that Flinco, Inc. was cancelled or was about 
to be cancelled because it had taken on the Miller Tire 
line. Evidence also revealed that complaints were made 
to the Flinco people about their handling the Miller Tire 
line although there was nothing in the franchise agree-
ment which indicated any restriction on Flinco's hand-
ling other lines of Rubber Tire products or accessories 
competitive to Goodyear. 
Flinco's position is that the real and basic reason for 
cancelling the dealership was the handling of the Miller 
Tire line and that this action on Goodyear Tire Com-
pany's part was a violation of the Anti-Monopoly Pro-
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v1s1ons of the Laws of the State of Utah contained in 
Title 50-1, etc., U. C. A., 1953. 
It is plaintiff's position that the evidence presented 
at the trial court presented a question of fact on each of 
the issues made by the pleadings and as set forth in this 
Statement of Fact and that the court violated the plain-
tiff's constitutional rights in refusing to submit the case 
to the jury on the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE GOODYEAR FRANCHISE AGREEMENT IS AM-
BIGUOUS IN ITS TERMS. 
POINT 2 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT 
EVIDENCE OF THE NEGOTIATION AND DISCUSSION 
PRIOR TO EXECUTION OF THE GOODYEAR FRANCHISE 
AGREEMENT. 
POINT 3 
THE EVIDENCE REVEALED A VIOLATION OF TITLE 
50-1-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED BY DEFENDANT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE GOODYEAR FRANCHISE AGREEMENT IS AM-
BIGUOUS IN ITS TERMS. 
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The Goodyear Franchise Agreement in paragraph 
6 provides: 
''Upon failure of dealer to make any payment 
when due, Goodyear may, at its option, cancel this 
agreement or defer additional shipments until 
overdo accounts have been paid." 
This is the only reference in the agreement relating 
to cancellation of the agreement except that paragraph 
14 states: 
"This agreement may be cancelled upon thirty 
days written notice by the dealer to Goodyear or 
by Goodyear, through its local manager, to the 
dealer." 
At no place in the franchise agreement is there any 
other grounds set forth for cancellation of the franchise 
agreement. 
The franchise agreement does not provide for an 
exclusive territory for plaintiff to sell in, nor does it 
restrict defendant's right to sell in the area which plain-
tiff operates. The contract does contain in paragraphs 
7, 8, 10, and 11, restrictions on the plaintiff's activities. 
In no place does the defendant retain the right to cancel 
the agreement except for failure to pay overdue accounts. 
The defendant claimed at the time of trial, and the 
Trial Court, in dismissing plaintiff's Complaint, ruled 
that defendant had an unrestricted right of cancellation 
7 
by giving thirty days written notice to plaintiff and that 
no cause need be present for such cancellation. 
Plaintiff contends that the right to cancel, as con-
tained in paragraph 14, must be read in conjunction with 
paragraph 6. If so interpreted, the agreement does not 
give defendant an unrestricted right of cancellation. 
In paragraph 13 of the agreement, it provides that 
the agreement shall expire five years from the day of 
execution unless previously terminated as hereinafter 
provided. A fixed term of this kind would seem super-
fluous if the agreement is terminable at will. 
The franchise agreement is a printed form supplied 
by the defendant. Blanks are filled in to designate the 
dealer, the types of products that he will handle, and fix-
ing a date on which the agreement is to commence. 
This court, on numerous occasions has ruled con-
cerning such documents, that the interpretation of the 
document must be most strongly against the party fur-
nishing the form and responsible for its contents. 
In the case of Barnard v. Hardy, 77 Ut. 218, 293 P. 
12, this court was concerned with a real estate broker's 
listing agreement. A part of the property listed had 
lwen sold through the efforts of the broker. The owner 
refused to pay the commision to the real estate broker. 
The court examined the listing agreement and discovered 
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that it did not provide for a commission in case a part 
of the property was sold. After discussing the plaintiff's 
claim and request that the Court should add, "Should I 
sell said property or any part thereof." A ruling was 
made in the following language, "The agreement was pre-
pared by plaintiff, on a printed form furnished by him 
and therefore must be construed most strongly against 
him." The court then refused to add the language to make 
possible commission on a partial sale of the real estate. 
In Mifflin v. Shiki, 77 Ut. 190, 293 P. 1, a printed , 
listing agreement furnished by a real estate broker and 
filled in by the broker was before the court. The question 
was whether or not the broker was entitled to a com-
mision on the trade of the list2d real estate or only where 
there was a sale for cash either on an installment or full 
payment transaction. This court refused to permit parol 
evidence to explain the ambiguity created in the printed 
part which was attempted to be cured by insertion of the 
word, "trade'' on an endorsement to the printed listing 
agreement. The court applied the rule that where a party 
furnishes a printed form, the language is interpreted 
most strongly against the party whose form is used. 
A case closest to the facts before the court is Cowley 
v. Anderson, (10 Cir.) 159 F. 2d 1, this case involved a 
contract between a dealer and supplier of poisonous sub-
stances used for rodent control. The contract between 
the dealer and the supplier provided for exclusive terri-
tory, required the dealer to exercise a certain amount of 
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diligence in exploiting the territory, and provid~cl that 
the agreement could be terminated for lack of diligence. 
The contract, as in the present case, was for a five-year 
period. The Circuit Court held that under such circum-
stance, the contract was a five-year contract and could 
not be terminated by the distributor at its will without 
cause. It pointed out that even though the dealer had a 
right to discontinue the contract, this does not create a 
lack of mutuality and grant to the distributor a right of 
termination without cause. 
It would have been a simple matter had the def en-
dant intended to reserve a right of termination, without 
cause, to have clearly set this out in its printed form. 
Since it did not, it is respectfully submitted that a proper 
construction of the contract would adopt the plaintiff's 
position that the right of cancellation was for cause 
only and that there was not an unreserved right of can-
cellation without cause, at the unrestricted will of de-
fendant. 
POINT 2 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO PERMIT 
EVIDENCE OF THE NEGOTIATION AND DISCUSSION 
PRIOR TO EXECUTION OF THE GOODYEAR FRANCHISE 
AGREEMENT. 
The negotiations preceding the execution of the 
Goodyear Franchise Agreement were carried on by one 
G. E. Ap Roberts, an employee of plaintiff. Plaintiff 
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propounded a question to Ap Roberts concerning his dis-
cusion with one Mr. Ferguson relating to the relationship 
between Flinco and Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company. 
The court refused to permit the answer of Ap Roberts 
(R. 67-68). Thereupon, counsel for plaintiff made an 
offer of proof that the witness, Ap Roberts would state 
that in all of the discussion with Ferguson, the contract 
was stated to be for a five-year term and was so intended 
by Ap Roberts and Flinco, Inc., that prior to the execu-
tion of the agreement it was understood that it was for 
a five-year term (R. 68-69). The court refused to permit 
this testimony and plaintiff claims this prejudiced its 
rights. 
The rules relating to parol evidence in aid of inter-
pretation of ambiguous agreements has been discussed 
on many occasions by this court. It is submitted that 
there is a clear rule that the evidence is admissible to 
aid in arriving at a proper and clear interpretation of 
a contract and to ascertain the intentions of the parties. 
Penn Star Mining Company v. Lyman, et al., 64 Ut. 
343, 231 P. 107, involved an appeal from a refusal by the 
trial court to permit parol evidence relating to certain 
documents and contracts on which the plaintiff sought 
recovery of damages. The defendant claimed the agree-
ment and contract was obscure, uncertain, and ambigu-
ous. The plaintiff claimed that it was perfectly clear and 
wholely free from ambiguity. The Trial Court refused 
to permit evidence from the defendant to show what the 
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language of the agreement actually meant. This Court 
reversed the Trial Court and stated that there was an 
extensive and well established rule that in cases where 
the language of a written instrument is obscure, uncer-
tain, or ambiguous so that the intentions of the party 
were left in doubt by an inspection of the instrument 
alone, extrinsic evidence within recognized linlits is al-
ways admissible to aid the court in arriving at the true 
intentions of the parties. This court in setting forth the 
principle and general rule, quoted at length the case of 
Salt Lake City v. Smith, 104 F. 457, 43 C.C.A. 642. In the 
recent case of Continental Bank and Trust Company v. 
Stewart, 4 Ut. 2d, 228, 291 P. 2d 890, cited again the Salt 
Lake City v. Smith case and quoted the rule for which 
that case stands in the following language: 
"It is true that the express terms of an agree-
ment may not be abrogated, nullified or modified 
by parol testimony; but where, because of vague-
ness or uncertainty in the language used, the in-
tent of the parties is in question, the court may 
consider the situation of the parties, the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the making of the con-
tract the purpose of its execution, and the res-pecti~e claims thereunder, to ascertain what the 
parties intended." 
The Penn Star case also stands for the proposition 
that where a party to a contract uses ambiguous lan-
guage, the language will be interpreted most strongly 
against the party using it. It cites with approval the 
proposition that when there is doubt as to meaning of a 
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contract, a party responsible for the language will be 
held to that meaning which he knew the other party sup-
posed the words to mean. 
Plaintiff attempted through the witness Ap Roberts, 
to show the court and jury what it was that the plaintiff 
believed the franchise agreement meant prior to its exe-
cution, and at the time of its execution, how the plaintiff 
interpreted the language of the printed form furnished ! 
to it by defendant. In refusing to permit plaintiff to 
make such showing, it is respectfully submitted the court 
erred to the prejudice of the plaintiff. 
Many Utah cases have applied the rule that extrin-
sic evidence may be admitted to show the meaning the 
parties gave to the agreement and the circumstances sur-
rounding their negotiations so that an accurate ascertain-
ment of the parties' intentions could be achieved. 
In Boley v. Butterfield, 57 Ut. 262, 194 P. 128, this 
court permitted extrinsic evidence to show that a lease 
of grazing permits was to be non-exclusive rather than 
exclusive. It permitted the defendant to show that the 
plaintiff had been advised that other persons were shar-
ing in the grazing area and that his permit was therefore 
not to be exclusive. 
In Read v. Forced Uniderfiring Corporntion, 82 Ut. 
529, 26 P. 2d, 325, this court permitted extrinsic evidence 
to show what was meant by "net profits." The evidence 
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revealed that at the time of the agreement, the director:,; 
were not being paid and this expense was not taken into 
consideration by the parties in arriving at the company's 
"net profits." 
In Vincent v. Federal Land Bank, 109 Ut. 191, 167 
P. 2d, 279, this court permitted evidence to show that an 
agreement that the property line would be at the edge of 
a body of water was intended to mean the shore of the 
body of water at the time of the agreement and not the 
receded shore line which was claimed by the plaintiff at 
the time of the trial. 
In Udy v. Jens en, 63 U t. 94, 222 P. 597, this court 
approved evidence that a contract involving the sale of 
stock was a mere option and the buyer was not bound to 
purchase, permitting evidence of statements made by the 
buyer at a directors' meeting where he advised the seller 
that he did not intend to be bound or jeopardize any of 
his property but only purchase if he could do so. Parol 
evidence was allowed to show the buyer did not intend 
more than an option. 
In Continental Bank and Trust Company v. Stewart, 
4 Ut. 2d 228, 291 P. 2d 890, this court in a scholarly opin-
ion permitted witnesses to testify to the meanings of 
obligations and debts and to show that the debts to be 
assumed by the buyer as a part of the purchase price of 
real estate, were secured debts. 
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In Maw v. Noble, 10 Ut. 2d 440, 354 P. 2d 121, the 
court permitted extrinsic evidence to show the meaning 
of an attorneys fee arrangement. It stated again the 
rule that party drawing an agreement which contains an 
uncertainty or ambiguity, should have the contract most 
strongly construed against him. The primary and more 
fundamental rule is that the contract must be looked at 
realisticly in the light of circumstances under which it 
was entered into and if the intent of the parties can be 
ascertained with a reasonable certainty, it must be given 
effect. 
In the case of Cornwall v. Willow Creek Country 
Club, 13 Ut. 2d 160, 369 P. 2d 928, the court set forth as 
the cardinal and primary rule of interpretation which 
plaintiff seeks to have applied in the present litigation 
and stated: 
"In interpreting a contract, the primary rule 
is to determine what the parties intended by what 
they said. The court may not add, ignore or dis-
card words in the process, but attempts to render 
certain the meaning of the provision in dispute 
by an objective and reasonable construction of the 
whole contract." 
Applying the rules set down in the Cornwall case, it 
would appear that only by ignoring the content of para-
graph 6 of the franchise agreement, could the court rule 
that the franchise agreement could be cancelled at the 
will of either party. It seems clear that if it is cancell-
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able at the will of either party, no reasons such as is set 
forth in paragraph 6 would be necessary for cancellation. 
It is plaintiff's position that the court in interpret-
ing the franchise agreement, should have received evi-
dence concerning the parties intentions, circumstances, 
and plans at the time the franchise agreement was en-
tered into, to ascertain the true intent. This court has 
determined, on numerous occasions, that under such cir-
cumstances, parol evidence may be received to resolve 
disputes concerning the meaning of ambiguous portions 
of the contract. 
In Burt v. Stringfellow, 45 Ut. 207, 143 P. 234, this 
court in an opinion written by Justice Frick examined 
the occasions when parol evidence may be received and 
set forth that it was proper to, (a) define the nature and 
quality of the subject matter, (b) situation and relation 
of the parties, ( c) all the circumstances surrounding the 
making of the contract. 
In a later case, Mathis v. Madsen, 1 Ut. 2d 46, 261 
P. 2d 952, the court has enlarged on the rule and set forth 
the order in which the intent of the parties to a contract 
that is ambiguous, should be ascertained. First, the 
language of the contract should be examined, second, any 
contemporary writings may be examined, and third, if 
the meaning of the agreement is still uncertain, then 
parol evidence of the parties' intentions and plans may 
be received. 
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Under all of the cases cited, the refusal by the trial 
court to permit the witnesses Ap Roberts and Tate to 
testify concerning the negotiations and discussions of 
the Goodyear Franchise Agreement, was error. 
POINT 3 
THE EVIDENCE REVEALED A VIOLATION OF TITLE 
50-1-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED BY DEFENDANT. 
Plaintiff's evidence revealed that agents and repre-
sentatives of defendant discussed with plaintiff's agents 
and representatives the fact that the plaintiff had taken 
on the distribution of an additional brand of tires since 
entering into the franchise agreement with Goodyear. 
In one conversation, the agent, R. W. Morrow, stated 
to Tate, President of Flinco, Inc. that he was in Salt 
Lake for the purpose of terminating Flinco, Inc. since 
they took on the Miller Tire line (R. 152). Similar state-
ments were made on other occasions to other representa-
tives of Flinco, Inc. (R. 90). 
This evidence is important on two separate facets 
of plaintiff's case; mainly on its claim for damages for 
monopolistic practices and second, it indicates that the 
defendant did not believe they could terminate the con-
tract without good and sufficient cause. 
The testimony of the plaintiff's witnesses to the 
effect that defendant in its distribution system required 
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its dealers to handle only Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
products and that the termination of Flinco, Inc. was 
related to its acceptance of an additional line of rubber 
products for distribution, is sufficient support for plain-
tiff's claim of a violation of Section 50-1-2 of Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953. From such testimony, the jury could 
find that the deftndant was a party to an agreement 
to fix or limit the amount or quality of rubber products 
which could be sold in the Flinco territory. 
If the jury believed Flinco's evidence, it could find 
a breach of the anti-monopoly laws of the State of Utah. 
Flinco would be entitled to triple damages for any dam-
age resulting from this agreement if the termination of 
its franchise was an act in furtherance of the agreement. 
It is plaintiff's position that such an act would amount 
to a wrongful termination. 
This court has on two separate occasions, considered 
the anti-monopoly laws of the State of Utah, and its 
decisions clearly recognize that any attempt to fix the 
price or the amount of merchandise to be distributed is 
against public policy. See Gammon v. Federated Milk 
Producers, 11 Ut. 2d 421, 360 P. 2d 1018, Zion Service 
Corps v. Danielson, 12 Ut. 2d 369, 366 P. 2d 982. 
The court did not permit plaintiff to continue with 
its evidence relating to damages. It directed the verdict 
on liability without permitting plaintiff to present its evi-
18 
dence on damages and losses by reason of the termi-
nation. 
The United States Supreme Court in Standard Oil 
v. U.S., 337 U.S. 293, 93 Law Ed. 1371, had before it a 
claimed violation of the Clayton Act by reason of Stand-
ard Oil's exclusive contracts with its independent oil 
dealers requiring them to handle only the Standard Oil 
line of products. 
That Court, in its opm10n, held that the contract 
tying an independent dealer to the Standard products 
was "a potential clog on competition" and "it would im-
pede a substantial amount of competitive activity" and 
it upheld the Trial Court's decision that Standard's tying 
agreements violated the Clayton Act prohibiting mono-
polistic and price-fixing practices. The Standard Oil case 
is a conclusive holding that if contracts similar to Good-
year Franchise Agreements are used to restrict the deal-
ers' rights to handle other brands of rubber products, 
they would be a violation of the principle of free compe-
tition and against the public policy. 
The only purpose of the tying agreement is to sup-
press competition. Plaintiff submits defendant might be 
found to have terminated the franchise agreement be-
cause Flinco, Inc. took on the Miller Tire line, and if it 
is so found, triple damages would follow. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the plaintiff should 
be granted a new trial and determined by this court that 
the evidence is sufficient to justify plaintiff's case being 
submitted to the jury on both of its theories and causes 
of action. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ---------------- day 
of May, 1965. 
DWIGHT L. KING 
Attorney for Pla.intiff-Appellant 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
